

Maneesha Deckha, *Animals as Legal Beings: Contesting Anthropocentric Legal Orders* (2021, University of Toronto Press), 348 pp., \$37.95 paperback.

Reviewed by Rimona Afana

The legal status of nonhumans has been hotly debated in academia, activism, and in courts over the past decades. Arguments have oscillated primarily between the property and personhood approaches (and their associated welfarist and abolitionist drives), which both come with ethical, legal, and practical challenges. *Animals as Legal Beings* introduces a different approach, centered on *beingness*, opposing the use and abuse which accompany the property approach while also transcending the anthropocentrism marking personhood. “Beingness thus offers a theoretical innovation as well as a practical solution to evading the impasse that currently encapsulates the core debate in animal law circles.”¹ To sketch beingness as a new legal category, Maneesha Deckha draws on feminist animal care theory, postcolonial feminist scholarship, and critical animal studies. While scholars across different disciplines informed the book, the works of Carol Adams, Josephine Donovan and Gary Francione are specified as foundational to the analysis.

Animals as Legal Beings seeks “a new, transformative legal status or subjectivity”² for animals, by integrating insights from critical theory into animal law, which remains dominated by a liberal, anthropocentric ethos. At the heart of Deckha’s project is a sentiment shared by many critical legal scholars: the law, particularly legal systems rooted in the Western liberal humanist tradition, is shaped by hierarchies when it comes to class, gender, ability, race, species, and other identity markers. The sociolegal treatment of these differences-turned-hierarchies generates structures of power, which in turn lead to violence, which can only be properly understood intersectionally. The condition of nonhumans and our fight for their rights are contextualized by Deckha within these multi-layered biological, cultural, political, legal dynamics. Thus,

¹ Maneesha Deckha, *Animals as Legal Beings: Contesting Anthropocentric Legal Orders* (University of Toronto Press 2021) 9.

² *Ibid* 6.

concepts such as human, animal, animality or personhood need to be situated within the constraints of the liberal legal tradition.

The deficiency of current animal laws is not the starting point of the analysis here; the law itself is. Deckha challenges the paradigmatic subject in liberal legalism: an independent, autonomous, rational, disembodied (in the sense that the fragility of our corporeality is not factored in) individual. This observation has been previously made by other theorists: I will only mention here the pioneering work of Martha Fineman, with whose Vulnerability Initiative I was previously affiliated. Fineman's vulnerability theory³, applied to a range of sociolegal issues, replaces this ideal(ized) legal subject with a version much closer to the reality of our human condition: embodied rather than disembodied, dependent and interdependent rather than autonomous, and vulnerable throughout our life span. Deckha embraces a similar notion of the actual (not ideal) legal subject when it comes to nonhumans. This approach is not new: over a decade ago, Ani Satz theorized animals as vulnerable subjects.⁴

Part 1, "Beyond Property and Personhood: Contesting Legal Objectification and Humanization" reviews the property/personhood debate, highlighting the shortcomings of both approaches. Part 2, "Animals as Beings: In Pursuit of a New Post-Anthropocentric Legal Order" posits beingness as an alternative legal category. Chapter 1, "No Escape: Anti-cruelty Laws' Property Foundations", covers the welfarist approach in Canada, similar to that in other legal systems rooted in British common law, which sustain human exceptionalism. Looking at Canada's Criminal Code and at a range of cases showing how anti-cruelty laws have been applied, Deckha concludes that animal protection laws rooted in the property approach are self-defeating, as they cannot adequately protect animals. Cruelty is framed in a narrow way, typically limited to the most severe of cases and usually victimizing companion animals. Cruelty routine in organized forms of animal (ab)use (sectors like food, clothing, research,

³ Martha A. Fineman, *The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency* (The New Press 2004); Martha A. Fineman, 'The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition' (2008) 20:1 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 1; Martha A. Fineman, 'The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State' (2010) 60:2 Emory Law Journal 251; Martha A. Fineman, 'Vulnerability and the Human Condition: A Different Approach to Equality' (2012) University of British Columbia, Cecil H. and Ida Green Visiting Professor Lecture Series <www.youtube.com/watch?v=seC6hqnpkPU>

⁴ Ani B. Satz, 'Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest—Convergence, Hierarchy, and Property' (2009) 16:2 Animal Law, 65.

entertainment) falls outside this narrow scope of anti-cruelty laws. Industries accepted culturally as normal and necessary are exempt from this reductionist notion of cruelty. Nonhumans are never truly protected within the property framework; their needs and interests are always assessed against the “superior” needs and rights of humans.

Anthropocentrism is central here: that’s why “unnecessary” precedes “suffering” in anti-cruelty laws in Canada and elsewhere. Suffering is implicit and accepted; only extra-ordinary cases of supposedly unnecessary suffering are outlawed. Speciesism, we are shown, also shapes anti-cruelty laws: these laws mostly benefit beings higher up the hierarchy, companion animals viewed as family members, yet farm animals and wild animals rarely enjoy any protections. Accompanying the anthropocentric and speciesist nature of these laws, there’s a colonial dimension too: the adoption of anti-cruelty laws was meant to exhibit or cultivate the virtues associated to civilized groups, along racialized and classist lines.⁵ Recent efforts to revise these laws have not changed much: though penalties and fines were increased and bans were introduced (such as the ban on captive cetaceans and on importing and exporting shark fins), animals remain in the property section of the Canadian Criminal Code and most instances of suffering-inducing (ab)use remain legal. The property status “strips the legal concept of cruelty from all but the most culturally aberrant acts”, leaving animals in a “legal abyss”.⁶ This chapter was particularly informative, as I was not familiar with Canadian anti-cruelty laws and how they’ve been applied in a variety of cases.

Chapter 2, “What’s Wrong with Personhood? The Humanizing Impact of *Anthropos*” turns to animals’ possible designation as persons. Over the past decades, many scholarly and civic initiatives have challenged animals’ property status: from Gary Francione’s inclusive theorization of personhood tied to his abolitionist approach, to Peter Singer’s and Paola Cavalieri’s Great Ape Project (started in 1993) or Steven Wise’s Nonhuman Rights Project (founded in 2007), seeking to advance legal rights for specific nonhumans considered similar enough to humans in terms of sentience, relatedness and needs, thus deserving similar rights (the sameness logic). Though Deckha favors the personhood approach over the property one, she sees such initiatives reinforcing the anthropocentric, speciesist nature of the law. This

⁵ Maneesha Deckha, *Animals as Legal Beings*, 44.

⁶ *Ibid* 76.

perspective is central in many critical animal studies and it is one I embrace too. First, because personhood is tied to human-centric assumptions and agendas, second because there's an inevitable hierarchy when it comes to the nonhumans given legal protections (just like, in the not-so-distant past, humans were themselves subjected to hierarchies determining the rights they were worth). Since "personhood is inherently an exclusionary category"⁷, an alternative legal status for animals is needed, one not shaped by "the hierarchical stratifications that are central to modernity and its colonizing impulses".⁸ Besides these philosophical arguments, I believe informative here would have been a brief discussion of how the personhood approach has been interpreted in different court rulings.

Chapter 3, "Toward a Post-Anthropocentric Legal Ontology", bridges prior discussions on the shortcomings of both property and personhood to the author's alternative: beingness. Before detailing this new legal category which decentres the human (Chapter 4), we are shown what the legal and cultural prerequisites might be. Deckha reviews here studies exploring why we need to care about and for nonhuman animals, particularly the perspectives of feminist animal care theorists, who highlight an ethics of care rooted in sympathy, empathy, and responsibility for animals. This foregrounds the role of emotions, in contrast to reason, prioritized by the law and by many animal rights scholars and activists. To me, an omission in this literature review is Richard Ryder's "painism", concept which highlights that all beings who feel pain deserve rights.⁹ Deckha discusses embodiment (Jennifer McWeeny's "topographies of the flesh" and other concepts) but does not enlarge on why embodiment matters morally. To me, it primarily matters because of pain: while the joys of sentient beings matter too, we have a greater moral duty to refrain from making them suffer. Something else missing here is the "how": I would have liked to learn how the author believes compassion can be triggered, instilled, incentivized. Apathy and even cruelty towards humans and nonhumans are so routine, that abstract talk on the desirability of compassion becomes an echo chamber: those writing and reading in this area know that already. I am myself often trapped in this echo chamber in what I write, say, and

⁷ Ibid 95.

⁸ Ibid 96.

⁹ Richard D. Ryder, *Speciesism, Painism and Happiness: A Morality for the Twenty-First Century* (Imprint Academic 2011).

do. Echoing is the “should”. That also concludes the chapter: “The law should recognize the shared somaticity we have with animals, lament the vulnerabilities they face, and seek to remove the causes of their suffering. The dominant legal order should also normalize human responsibility toward animals because of our dominating power”.¹⁰

The book’s second part starts with chapter 4, “Beingness: A New Legal Subjectivity for Animals”: we are introduced to Deckha’s alternative to property and personhood, a legal category better responding to animals’ individuality and needs. The beingness model treats animals as embodied, relational, and vulnerable, in contrast to the personhood model which treats its subjects as disembodied, independent/autonomous, and rational.¹¹ We are walked through a variety of studies highlighting the significance of the body/embodiment, of relationality and of vulnerability; these repeat or expand discussions in the prior chapter. Arguments here draw primarily on Judith Butler’s theorization of vulnerability and precarity (though Butler focuses on humans, the theory seems equally applicable to nonhumans) and briefly discussing Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory (critiqued for its “residual liberalism”¹²). I pointed out earlier that in Chapter 3 there is not much detail on why embodiment should matter ethically, specifically no discussion of pain/suffering; here, Deckha does cover some interesting aspects of suffering, which I would have liked to see elaborated. Given the chapter’s title, I was hoping this section would discuss some specifics of the author’s proposal, but this is again an extended literature review which remains abstract. The chapter concludes with the claim that beingness, with its focus on the vulnerable, embodied, relational aspects of animals, is a paradigm shift and would better protect them against instrumental use.¹³ We are not shown what beingness would entail in practice: whom it would protect and how, and why any deeply anthropocentric legal system would adopt a non-anthropocentric, anti-speciesist model. There are also no illustrations of recent animal rights activism and developments in animal law and in environmental law which might support (or not) the beingness model.

¹⁰ Maneesha Deckha, *Animals as Legal Beings*, 117.

¹¹ *Ibid* 122.

¹² *Ibid* 131.

¹³ *Ibid* 141.

Chapter 5, “Liberal Humanism Repackaged?” is where we finally get to some of the nuances I had been waiting for. Deckha turns to the “difficult and sparsely theorized issue of ‘line drawing’”¹⁴: which animals would be covered by this new legal category. The author extends “beingness” to all animals: mammals, reptiles, amphibians, fish, insects. To me the most captivating part of the book is the subsequent discussion: should sentience be the benchmark for inclusion?¹⁵ Various studies are reviewed, covering amniocentrism (including all animals), biocentrism (including all forms of life), and ontocentrism (including all entities, also inanimate ones). The literature suggests that, no matter how inclusive a proposal supposedly is, line-drawing leads to exclusionary, hierarchical results. As David Gunkel notes (quoted by Deckha), all centrist approaches, though distancing themselves from anthropocentrism, get to the same conundrum: “... they include others by effectively stripping away and reducing differences. This approach, although having the appearance of being increasingly more inclusive, effaces the unique alterity of others”.¹⁶

Deckha agrees with scholars who believe that, though sentience can be meaningful for line-drawing, all animate and inanimate entities are interdependent, so prioritizing the rights of one group over another runs the risk of harming all. The qualifying or separating line thus remains blurry. The author does not embrace narrow capacity-based approaches to personhood, but recognizes that appraising capacities is needed for responding to the specific vulnerabilities of each being.¹⁷ So “... beingness considers capacities beyond sentience. At the same time, it likely privileges sentience in many instances because of sentience’s correlation with vulnerability and suffering.”¹⁸ I resonate with this tailored approach, but the problem with it is our ignorance about capacities (sentience included): we still know so little about the needs, joys and pains of nonhuman animals. We know little about species and we know even less about the immense variability of individuals. Also, only a small part of the world’s biodiversity is known and has been studied. Multiple layers of opacity linger: we know little even about the little we do know. This presents a challenge to inclusive models like

¹⁴ Ibid 143.

¹⁵ Ibid 145–157.

¹⁶ David J. Gunkel, ‘A Vindication of the Rights of Machines’ (2014) 27:1 *Philosophy and Technology* 113, 124.

¹⁷ Deckha, *Animals as Legal Beings*, 151.

¹⁸ Ibid 152.

beingness which cover all animals, as opposed to the narrow way in which animal lawyers are typically seeking rights for only a few animals: chimpanzees, elephants, cats, dogs, and other animals whose capacities are well studied.

Beingness would not cover plants, as human and nonhuman animals depend on them to survive; since an entity cannot qualify simultaneously under beingness and property, taking plants out of the property box would mean they can no longer be subjected to instrumental use.¹⁹ Deckha mentions that giving rights to bodies of water on which humans and animals don't depend for survival (such as some rivers or glaciers, which have been given rights in certain jurisdictions) is congruent with beingness since these ecosystems are animate, thus we can think of them as embodied, vulnerable, relational.²⁰ I would have welcomed here a broader discussion on how the growing Rights of Nature movement might align with the beingness model.

The book's conclusion delineates some practicalities around beingness; this new legal category would rest on three guiding principles: "(1) a prohibition on human and corporate trade in animals or animal products; (2) a rejection of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism, and (3) a desire to listen to and respond to the needs of vulnerable Others."²¹ In Canada specifically, the federal government would amend the Criminal Code to render animal trade illegal and then subordinate legislation would be needed to specify the details of this amendment and ensure the transition. The author does not clarify what would happen to the millions of animals who could still be used and abused even outside formal trade structures. We are only told that the principles of feminist care ethics and interdisciplinary expertise should guide decision-makers.²² A supplement to legislation, the author notes, should be our listening to and partnering with animals, and the oft-invoked concept of bearing witness.

Often the book feels like an extended literature review, a patchwork of perspectives from various studies, which obscures the author's own contribution. This is compounded by the lack of primary data, which could have supported the originality of the book, though I am unsure what sort of primary data could have been generated

¹⁹ Ibid 155.

²⁰ Ibid 156.

²¹ Ibid 168.

²² Ibid 174.

to enrich this discussion. Often the arguments turn repetitive while other points are insufficiently explored or conveyed in an unnuanced manner. For instance, the recurrent critique of hegemonic Western frameworks and the claim that non-Western, indigenous belief systems are more respectful and caring of nonhumans lacks a discussion of how these cultures also exact violence on nonhumans and do very well to justify it. Detail and nuance are however not always convenient for reasons beyond the author's decision; one of them is the trend embraced by many presses to publish shorter and simpler books. For this reason and others, complex intellectual projects can get diluted.

I would like to move now to some reflections on related books and adjacent topics, which Deckha's arguments made me think of. *Animals as Legal Beings* joins several significant studies over the past decades exploring the legal status of nonhumans. As the space here does not allow me to discuss more relevant titles and since my interest in this area outweighs my actual knowledge of it, I will only mention a few books. The first that comes to mind is Gary Francione's discussion of legal welfarism, tied to the property status conferred to nonhumans²³; Deckha's work creates a conversation, 26 years later, with Francione's epilogue. The next book I thought of while reading it is by Lesli Bisgould, Canada's first animal rights lawyer, who also explores the multiple paradoxes and inconsistencies in how the law treats nonhuman animals.²⁴

Over the past few years, Anne Peters has edited two major studies in global animal law²⁵; the nascent field of global animal law is a response to the paradox that, although our use and abuse of nonhumans are transboundary and increasingly global, the legal treatment of these harms remains mostly national, conditioned by the specifics of each jurisdiction. Earlier this year, two new studies were published, exploring various facets of animal rights: one is Saskia Stucki's introduction of One Rights (normative correspondent of the One Health approach) as response to the interdependence and indivisibility of human and nonhuman rights.²⁶ Another is Raffael Fasel's and Sean

²³ Gary L. Francione, *Animals, Property & The Law* (Temple University Press 1995).

²⁴ Lesli Bisgould, *Animals and the Law* (Irwin Press 2011).

²⁵ Anne Peters, ed, *Studies in Global Animal Law* (Springer 2020) <<https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-662-60756-5>>; Anne Peters, Kristen Stilt, Saskia Stucki (eds), *The Oxford Handbook on Global Animal Law* (Oxford University Press 2023).

²⁶ Saskia Stucki, *One Rights: Human and Animal Rights in the Anthropocene* (Springer 2023) <<https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-19201-2>>

Butler’s detailed survey of a variety of animal rights issues, from legality to ethics, and wider social ramifications.²⁷

Tied to Deckha’s argument is also Visa Kurki’s broader re-examination of legal personhood²⁸, given the varied challenges presented to conventional approaches to legal subjectivity (what Kurki calls the “Orthodox View”, widely adopted since the 19th century): from recent efforts to extend it to individual nonhuman animals or to wider ecosystems such as rivers, lakes and forests, to questions on whether foetuses or artificial intelligence can qualify for legal personhood, or the decades-long debate on the legal personhood corporations enjoy. An earlier examination of legal personhood is Colin Dayan’s *The Law is a White Dog*²⁹, book I found particularly illuminating and which is included in Deckha’s discussion of personhood and animality as mutually exclusive.³⁰ I will also add here Piers Beirne’s investigation of animal legal personhood, specifically in relation to the massive, intentional killing of animals; here, theriocide appears as the possible equivalent of homicide.³¹

Many other proposals have been formulated over the years on the legal status of nonhumans. One is David Favre’s proposal to treat nonhuman animals as a distinct category of property: living property, which allows (some!) nonhumans to possess and exercise legal rights.³² Arguably related to Deckha’s focus on beingness, Favre grounds his discussion in the entity’s beingness/aliveness: “Moral and ethical concerns should start with all beings who have self-interests, meaning those who are driven to live a life by the encoding of their DNA.”³³ As living property, nonhuman animals would have rights such as (Favre’s non-exhaustive list): not to be held for or put to prohibited uses; not to be harmed; to be cared for; to have living space; to be properly owned; to own property; to enter into contracts; to file tort claims.³⁴ All these rights come of course

²⁷ Raffael Fasel and Sean Butler, *Animal Rights Law* (Bloomsbury 2023).

²⁸ Visa Kurki, *A Theory of Legal Personhood* (Oxford University Press 2019) <<https://academic.oup.com/book/35026>>

²⁹ Colin Dayan, *The Law Is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons* (Princeton University Press 2011).

³⁰ Maneesha Deckha, *Animals as Legal Beings*, 90.

³¹ Piers Beirne with Ian O’Donnell and Janine Jansse, *Murdering Animals: Writings on Theriocide, Homicide and Nonspeciesist Criminology* (Palgrave Macmillan 2018).

³² David Favre, ‘Living Property: A New Status for Animals within the Legal System’ (2010) 93:3 *Marquette Law Review* 1021; David Favre, ‘Animals as Living Property’ in Linda Kalof, ed, *The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies* (Oxford University Press 2014) 65.

³³ David Favre, ‘Living Property’, 1043.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 1061–1069.

with many practical and philosophical challenges. Worth mentioning here is also Angela Fernandez’s “quasi” approach: treating nonhuman animals as both property and persons; this quasi-property/quasi-persons approach is meant to capture flexibly the virtues of each concept and transcend the binaries characteristic of animal law in favor of a pragmatic compromise.³⁵

Though the animal welfare vs. animal rights debate is ongoing in academic and activist circles, globally most jurisdictions remain firmly anchored in the anthropocentric, speciesist welfare approach, tied to the animals’ property status. The welfarist approach is paradoxical: it theoretically improves the lives of nonhumans while permitting the captivity, torture and killing of billions. This approach sustains normalized anomalies such as industrial animal farming (IAF) and wildlife trade (WLT), which I treat as manifestations of the genocide–ecocide continuum, in contrast to their current status as legal, normal and supposedly necessary economies.³⁶ While ecocide remains not criminalized, the current legal status of genocide only criminalizes a narrow portion of harms, perpetrated solely against humans.

Noncriminalized criminality is thus the norm in our treatment of nonhumans. This is not only an individual failure: these massive crimes against billions of nonhumans, victims of sectors such as IAF and WLT, are indeed perpetrated by individuals and corporations. But, as I’ve highlighted in an earlier discussion of wildlife trade (artificially distinguished from wildlife trafficking, in spite of their equally horrendous impact on sentient freeborn nonhumans), “not criminalizing a grave harm is itself a form of criminality”.³⁷ From this perspective, I see states themselves being criminal for permitting massive crimes against sentient beings within their jurisdiction. This is a maximalist approach to accountability with dim chances of being realized within our lifetime. What we are left with is seeking to enhance justice within an unjust

³⁵ Angela Fernandez, ‘Not Quite Property, Not Quite Persons: A “Quasi” Approach for Nonhuman Animals’ (2019) 5 *Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law* 155; Angela Fernandez, ‘Animals as Property, Quasi-Property or Quasi-Person’ (2021) The Brooks Institute <<https://thebrooks institute.org/sites/default/files/presentations/Animal%20Law%20Fundamentals%20Fernandez%20Formatted%2011.19.21.pdf>>

³⁶ Rimona Afana, ‘From Speciesism to Theriocide: Wildlife Trade and Industrial Animal Farming as Embodiments of the Ecocide–Genocide Continuum’ (2022) IUCN International Environmental Law Conference, Oslo/Norway, 3–6 October.

³⁷ Rimona Afana, ‘Review of Ragnhild A. Sollund, *The Crimes of Wildlife Trafficking: Issues of Justice, Legality and Morality*’ (2021) 10:2 *State Crime Journal* 335, 337 <<https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.10.2.0335>>

framework rooted in our extractivist rapport to nonhumans and nature (often, even to fellow humans).

How can scholars and activists enhance protections for nonhuman animals? One path is by engaging in a deeper dialogue with environmental lawyers. A limitation we often see in environmental law supposedly protecting nature and nonhumans is its disproportionate focus on species conservation and disregard for individual suffering. As I've noted in an earlier article, this approach is evident in the CITES Treaty (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora), in last year's Biodiversity Deal (the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework), as well as in the recent High Seas Treaty (Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement).³⁸ While species are conserved, individual nonhumans can still be displaced, abducted, confined, tortured, and killed. We see that happening to, for instance, the billions of victims of wildlife trade, which, as I earlier mentioned, remains legal and artificially distinguished from wildlife trafficking. While protecting species may appear more feasible than valuing individuals, nonhuman animals are not primarily species, but individuals with distinct needs and a right to not be harmed. This is just one of the many areas where a deeper dialogue between environmental law and animal rights law is needed. Instructive here is the second edition of a book curated by Randall Abate, which brings together 29 chapters exploring different cases illustrative of how animal law can learn from the more established field of environmental law.³⁹ This dialogue may also help environmental law embrace a more critical approach to nonhumans and nature.

Animals as Legal Beings contributes to non-anthropocentric, anti-speciesist studies advancing nonhuman rights. Like many other articles and books, these remain thought experiments seeking to transcend the current constraints of the legal system. These constraints reflect the multi-layered, paradoxical sociopolitical dynamics shaping the law. Though the beingness model (or anything close to it) remains remote from implementation, we continue to witness many wins for animals within different

³⁸ Rimona Afana, 'We Gifted the Ocean a Sea of Petroleum, Excrements, Robots and Plastics' (2023) 35:2 Journal of Environmental Law 307 <https://academic.oup.com/jel/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jel/eqad014/7172755?utm_source=authortollfreelink&utm_campaign=jel&utm_medium=email&guestAccessKey=4f60199c-51c5-4060-9ccb-f7cd5cde5905>

³⁹ Randall Abate, ed, *What Can Animal Law Learn from Environmental Law?* (2nd edition, Environmental Law Institute 2020).

jurisdictions. While most of these victories are modest and do not challenge animals' property status and their normalized use and abuse, this wave of sociocultural and legal changes in recent years is encouraging. I will only mention two developments, relevant to Deckha's focus on Canada, happening as I am writing this book review. In June 2023, Canada passed an amendment to its Environmental Protection Act, which seeks to replace, reduce or refine the use of vertebrate animals in toxicity testing⁴⁰ and also passed an amendment to the Food and Drugs Act, banning cosmetics testing on animals.⁴¹ Another development in June 2023, relevant to this book's arguments, is the *habeas corpus* petition filed by the Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of five African elephants held captive since the '70s/'80s at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo in Colorado Springs.⁴² Animal rights scholars and activists will find in *Animals as Legal Beings* a meticulously researched project, so valuable for contextualizing these recent wins for animals...which alas remain limited in scope.

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⁴⁰ Bill S-5, *An Act to amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, to make related amendments to the Food and Drugs Act and to repeal the Perfluorooctane Sulfonate Virtual Elimination Act*, 1st Sess., 44th Parl., 2023 <<https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/S-5/royal-assent>>

⁴¹ Government of Canada, 'Health Canada Announces the End of Cosmetic Animal Testing in Canada' (2023) <<https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/news/2023/06/health-canada-announces-the-end-of-cosmetic-animal-testing-in-canada.html>>

⁴² *Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo v. Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Society and Bob Chastain, President & CEO of Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Society* (2023) 4th Judicial District El Paso County, Colorado Springs <<https://perma.cc/DFS6-YJGG>>